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ETIQUETTE TIPS: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF
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INTRODUCTION

When the United States Supreme Court decided Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,' it was widely regarded as
having consigned to the realm of politics the issue of the proper
scope of federal legislative authority over the states, at least insofar as the commerce power is concerned. Although Garcia has
undoubtedly increased the leeway with which Congress may regulate state activities that affect interstate commerce, the Court has
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Thanks to
Hastings for financial and other support of this project and to the Northwestern School
of Law of Lewis & Clark College, which provided a pleasant summer environment for
some of the thought that went into this endeavor. Thanks also to Paul Mishkin for discussion of some of these ideas with me.
1. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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nonetheless continued to probe the outer boundaries of this
power. In so doing the Court has begun to reconceive the
method by which the Constitution imposes limits on the ability of
the Congress to exert its legislative will upon the states. In the
words of Justice O'Connor, on behalf of the Court, the "Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program,"2 nor has the Constitution ever
"been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require
the States to govern according to Congress' instructions."3 In
short, "federalism requires that the federal government respect
the autonomy of state governments as the possessors of independent institutional processes, even when Congress legislates
in an area in which it has the constitutional authority completely
to preempt state choices." 4This reconception-that federal
power may not be used to intrude upon the autonomous and
independent process of state governance-is an unfinished
work, and while its general outlines are now available for study,
much embellishing detail remains to be done. This is an opportune moment to reflect upon the implications of this apparent
new mode of judicial preservation of some modicum of state autonomy amidst the flood of federal legislative power under the
Commerce Clause.
From the moment the Constitution created the then-radical
axiom that the federal government was one of enumerated powers, and that the powers not delegated to it remain with the
states,5 the Court was faced with the choice of whether to treat
this new federalism as enforceable only (or primarily) through
political channels or to create a legally enforceable federalism, by
policing the boundaries of federal and state power in lawsuits
appropriately presenting the question for decision. Years ago,
Professor Charles Black reminded us of the distinction between a
legally enforceable federalism, containing a "core of constitutional right that courts will enforce,"6 and a politically enforceable federalism, one that has its "basis in the political structure of
the national government,"7 and that is not susceptible to judicial
2. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2435 (1992).
3. Id. at 2421.
4. H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 Va. L. Rev. 633, 641
(1993). Professor Powell is the originator of the "autonomy of process" label.
5. Except, of course, for the welter of prohibitions upon state authority that are expressly or impliedly sprinkled throughout the Constitution.
6. CHARLE-s
L. BLACJP., PERSPECTIrVS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 29 (rev. ed. 1970).
7. Id.
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review. Both forms of federalism are coherent, but their mechanisms of development are quite different.
Virtually from the beginning of American constitutional law,
the Supreme Court chose to fashion a legally enforceable federalism, perhaps most dramatically in McCulloch v. Maryland.8 But it
need not have done so. It is, of course, idle to speculate upon
what might have been our constitutional history had the question
of the proper scope of federal power been left from the beginning to the vicissitudes of ordinary politics. When in Garcia the
Court embraced the strategy of a politically enforceable federalism, it did so upon a background of nearly two centuries of attempted legal enforcement of the allocation of power between
the states and the central government. To be sure, the Court's
turn toward a politically enforceable federalism may have resulted in part from the perceived difficulties attendant to principled legal enforcement of federalism. But even in doing so the
Court in Garcialeft the door open for subsequent judicial review
of the federalism outcomes produced by the political process. In
subsequent cases, particularly Gregory v. Ashcrof? and New York v.
United States,1" the Court has begun to articulate the judicial restraints that still fetter congressional attempts to impose its will
upon the states. The net result is the emergence of a hybrid form
of federalism, neither completely political nor wholly legal.
Rather, the emerging "process federalism" is one characterized
by a willingness to let Congress impose its will upon the states so
long as that imposition is performed in a procedurally restrained
fashion.
In this article I explore some of the issues raised by this methodological move of the Court. What objectives are sought by the
Court's "process federalism" limits? Are those objectives in fact
being realized? If not, are there other judicially imposed limits
on congressional power that might be better means to the desired ends, and if so, are those substitutes capable of practical
implementation? If the Court's objectives underlying process federalism are not being realized, is it because we are pursuing the
wrong objectives, and if so, are there other objectives that are
worthwhile to accomplish and that would be well-served by "process federalism"? I do not hope to answer everything about feder8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
9. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
10. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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alism (that would surely be both a forlorn hope and a
preposterous ambition), but I do hope to raise some difficult
questions and, by doing so, prod the constitutional community to
re-examine some of the doctrinal scaffolding appurtenant to
American federalism.
My plan of attack is simple. Part I briefly examines the methods employed by the Court to enforce federalism limits upon
Congress as a matter of law. The purpose for so doing is to expose the perceived flaws in the legally enforceable strategy of federalism that led to its practical demise and apparent outright
rejection in Garcia.This is familiar history, and I do not intend to
rehearse it in laborious detail.
Part II will detail the development of process federalism by
noting the doctrinal structure that has been created in the wake
of Garciaand relating that structure to a congeries of prudential
and constitutional doctrines that operate to confine the sphere
of federal judicial authority. It is my contention that a slightly
different but quite related version of process federalism has been
at work for some time with respect to the allocation of judicial
power between state and federal courts. The seemingly emergent
process federalism that operates to shape congressional exercise
of legislative authority upon the states is derived from the preexistent judicial federalism. Part II will describe those developments and attempt to forge the connection between judicial federalism and Justice O'Connor's process federalism.
Part III explores the objectives sought to be attained by process
federalism and attempts to answer a number of questions raised
by identification of those objectives. Are the identified objectives
worth attaining? If so, might those objectives be better attained
by additional restraints upon Congress? What restraints? Are
these additional restraints practicable? If the identified objectives
are not worth attaining, should we scrap the entire venture of
process federalism or are there other objectives which are worthy
of pursuit?
The conclusions proffered may be briefly summarized. One
principal objective of process federalism is to insure that federal
legislators are held politically accountable for their actions. To
that end, they should not be permitted to foist their own hard
choices off on state legislatures with the resultant misimpression
that the states are responsible for political choices that are, in
fact, dictated from Capitol Hill. This may well be a worthwhile
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ambition, but the present mechanisms for causing it to occur are
inadequate. Perhaps the most glaring omission is the failure of
the Court to fashion some more meaningful set of restraints
upon congressional exercise of the conditional spending power,
currently a powerful device by which Congress can dangle cash as
irresistible bait for state legislatures. The political consequences
of rising to the bait are, however, largely visited upon the states.
Another principal objective of process federalism is to remain
faithful to the constitutional plan of dual sovereignties, each
holding plenary authority within its legitimate sphere. This idea
permeates the structure of the Constitution; to discard it as not
worth pursuing is to repudiate a reasonably clear core principle
of our Constitution. Accordingly, process federalism attempts to
insulate some sphere of state sovereignty from federal control.
The problem, however, is that the devices employed by process
federalism are lacking in substance. The sovereignty that is left is
solely the product of congressional grace. Noblesse oblige may not
hurt quite so much as brutal tyranny, but the effect on the serf's
autonomy is hardly distinguishable. In the extreme, process federalism leaves the state legislatures with little more true sovereignty than a high school model United Nations. Ultimately the
conflict between legal federalism and political federalism becomes irreconcilable. If the Court is to believe in political federalism, it will abandon any attempt to erect rigid barriers to the
exercise of congressional power over the states, contenting itself
with procedural obstacles that force Congress merely to act with
deliberate and evident purpose whenever it desires to compel
state conformity. At this point process federalism is reduced to a
set of etiquette tips for foxes entrusted with the job of guarding
the henhouse. The hens may all be missing in the morning, but
so long as the fox has observed the proper protocol nobody will
inquire of the bulge in the fox's stomach. In the alternative, if
the Court chooses to protect directly some vestige of state sovereignty, it must rethink the legally enforceable substantive barriers
to the exercise of congressional authority over the states. A return to National League of Cities v. Usery1 will not do; the distinction between the state as government and the state as proprietor
was hopelessly chaotic and incoherent, deserving the coup de grace
administered by Garcia.
11. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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But substantive limits on congressional power to regulate the
states can be created. Congress might be required tojustify more
stringently its use of the commerce or conditional spending powers when exercising them to regulate the states than when regulating the behavior of private citizens. This proposal, discussed in
more detail in Part III, is a modest alteration to existing doctrine.
A much more radical proposal would be to grant the states a
complete immunity from the scope of the commerce power.
That is not to suggest that states would possess the power to
thumb their noses at the Constitution. States would continue to
be bound by all the strictures that invalidate their actions, most
notably (but not exclusively) the Fourteenth Amendment. And
the negative or dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause would
continue ,to inhibit states from undertaking initiatives that would
be perniciously destructive of national economic union. Though
admittedly radical surgery, this idea is worth some consideration;
the doctrinal retooling necessary to administer such a blanket
immunity without destructive effect upon the national polity is
not likely to be as enormous an undertaking as might be reflexively assumed. But the game may not be worth the candle. On
this point, and with respect to this objective, that may be the
Court's ultimate choice.
II.

THE MODES OF LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE FEDERALISM

Two principal strategies for accomplishing legally enforceable
federalism have preoccupied the Court. One of these has been
the effort to confine the scope of the federal government's enumerated powers sufficiently to permit to the states some effective
zone of exclusive legislative authority. The other has been to concede a virtually unlimited scope to federal legislative authority
but to identify zones of immunity granted the states from the
authority of Congress.
A.

Confining the Scope of the Enumerated Powers of the Federal
Government

The earliest approach was to fasten seriously upon the Constitution's enumeration of federal powers as both sources of federal
authority and, by implication, limits on the exercise of federal
authority. Although that approach has fallen into judicial disfavor as a result of the constitutional revolution occasioned by
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, its vestigial elements remain pep-
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pered throughout constitutional law, usually as quite weak limitations upon the scope of any given federal power. For example, in
examining the proper scope of the commerce power, "when
Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only whether the finding is rational."' 2 So long as some minimally plausible after-the-fact claim
can be made that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, the Court will likely presume that Congress might have
relied on that state of affairs, even when it is perfectly evident
that Congress was totally unconcerned with the regulated activity's connection with interstate commerce.
An even more shrunken test applies to judicial examination of
the scope of the federal taxing power. Although Bailey v. Drexel
FurnitureCo.13 invalidated a tax on profits derived from the use of
child labor on the ground that it was a "penalty," imposed simply
for the purpose of regulating behavior, the Court has consistently shied away from labeling taxes as penalties. In upholding a
tax on firearms dealers the Court conceded that "[e]very tax is in
some measure regulatory," but concluded that incidental regulation does not vitiate congressional power to 'tax. 4 So long as the
tax "is productive of some revenue... it operates as a tax...
[and] is within the taxing power."' 5 Thus if it quacks like a duck,
it must be a duck, even if it looks like an 800 pound gorilla.
Limits on the spending power of Congress are similarly weak.
Even in United States v. Butler, 6 when the Court struck down
Franklin Roosevelt's Agricultural Adjustment Act as an invalid exercise of the spending power, Congress was conceded the power
to spend for the general welfare rather than for any of the specifically enumerated powers of Congress. Congressional discretion
in spending is now virtually unencumbered; the Court will inter12. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981). The limitation is
even weaker, indeed, it is apparently not even necessary that "Congress ...make particularized findings in order to legislate." Perezv. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971). See
also United States v. Edwards, 62 U.S.L.W. 2424 (9th Cir., Dec. 21, 1993) (upholding the
power of Congress under the commerce clause to enact legislation prohibiting the possession of firearms on school grounds or within 1000 feet thereof despite the lack of factual
findings that the activity affected interstate commerce or express invocation of the commerce power). But see United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir., 1993) (invalidating the
same statute on the grounds that in the absence of a specific factual finding by Congress
that the activity affected interstate commerce, Congress lacked authority under the comgranted, 114 S.Ct. 1536 (1994).
merce clause to enact the statute), cert.
13. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
14. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
15. Id. at 514.
16. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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vene only if the congressional choice is "a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise of judgment."17 The only potentially
meaningful limit on the spending power that Congress faces is
when it conditions the receipt of federal funds upon state compliance with some specified action. To do so validly, Congress
may only impose conditions that are related to federal interests
in "particular national projects or programs," that do not coerce
the states, that are not violative of some other constitutional provision, and then only if Congress expresses the condition "unambiguously.""8 These limits are not terribly stringent. Congress
may withhold highway construction funds if a state fails to conform to a federally mandated minimum drinking age. 19 Congress
may withhold federal funds for a wide variety of health programs
if the states fail to enact legislation requiring the state's health
planning agency to supervise and approve major capital develop20
ment projects by hospitals.
Similarly weak judicial limits attend the war power. Though
not often asserted by Congress as a source of regulatory authority, the power of Congress to declare war appears to confer upon
it power far beyond that momentous enough decision. In Woods
v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 2 1 the Court concluded that "this vague, undefined and indefinable 'war power' ",22 was sufficient to sustain
nationwide rent-control legislation. Although the Court recited
that "the question whether the war power has been properly employed . . . is open to judicial inquiry," it nevertheless opaquely
observed that the congressional judgment concerning the propriety of its exercise was "entitled to the respect granted like legislation enacted pursuant to the police power."2 3 But the
Constitution never once uses the term "police power," much less
explicitly confers upon Congress this source of legislative authority. It is, however, a term to describe "an inherent attribute of
sovereignty" 24 and, as such, it raises the troubling question of
whether the federal legislative powers are bounded at all. The
Court's cavalier equation of the "war power" with this ill-defined,
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
See id.
See North Carolina v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
333 U.S. 138 (1948).
Id. at 146 (Jackson,J, concurring).
Id. at 144.
24. RicHuA A. EPSTEIN, TAKINcs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do.
MAIN 108 (1985).
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atextual, inherent-in-all-government police power is an unfortunate suggestion that, at bottom, Congress can do pretty much
what it wants so long as it seems to have some plausible reason
for so acting.
Congressional power to implement treaties is bounded only by
5
the "prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution."2
Whatever Justice Holmes meant by this enigmatic pronouncement, laterJustices have concluded that the treaty power of Congress must conform to the individual rights limitations of the
Constitution, but that the power of Congress to implement treabounded by any limitations preservative of state
ties is not
26
authority.
Nor is congressional power under the Reconstruction amendments particularly confined. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,27 the Court
concluded that Congress could declare New York's English literacy predicate for voting a violation of equal protection despite
the fact that the Court had earlier concluded 28 that such literacy
requirements did not violate either the 14th or 15th Amendments. So long as the Court can "perceive a basis upon which
Congress might predicate a judgment that the [subject matter of
the legislation] constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause"29 and the congressional action, in the Court's opinion, does not "restrict, abrogate, or
dilute" equal protection,"° Congress is free to redefine the substantive content of equal protection. This, of course, is in marked
contrast to the power of the states. Current doctrine holds that
the identical action-voluntary adoption of race-conscious remedies in the absence of specific past racial discrimination-when
undertaken by the states violates equal protection, but when unCongress is a legitimate redefinition of equal
dertaken by
31
protection.
25. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
26. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (finding the treaty power limited by the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial requirement).
27. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
28. See Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959).
29. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 653.
30. Id.at 651, n.10.
31. CompareCity of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 470 (1989) (city's race
based set-aside program violated Fourteenth Amendment) with Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. Federal Comm. Comm'n., 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990) (FCC's race based set-aside program does not violate Fourteenth Amendment). The issue raised in Metro Broadcastingwill
be revisited by the Court this term. See Adarand Construction v. Pena, 93-1841.
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To be sure, there may be some federalism limits applicable to
this source of congressional power. In Oregon v. Mitchell,3 2 the
Court invalidated an amendment to the Voting Rights Act that
prohibited the states from establishing a minimum voting age of
more than 18 years in state elections. Writing for the Court, Justice Hugo Black noted that
[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement power [under the
Reconstruction Amendments] is, it is not unlimited.... [T] he
power granted to Congress was not intended to strip the States
of their power to govern themselves or to convert our national
government of enumerated powers into a central government
of unrestrained
authority over every inch of the whole
33
Nation.
Although Congress certainly has the authority to limit state authority in order "[t]o fulfill [the Reconstruction Amendments']
goal of ending racial discrimination and to prevent direct or indirect legislative encroachment on the rights guaranteed by the
amendments,"3 4 Justice Black's opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell
stands as a sharp reminder that Congress may not use its enforcement powers under the Reconstruction Amendments to redefine
the substance of equal protection as it pleases. Some ill-defined
federalism limits remain; at least Congress may not use its power
over the substance of equal protection to gut the autonomous
governance processes of a state. Less clearly articulated are the
limits imposed on congressional ability to use the Reconstruction
Amendments as a device to extend the scope of federal authority
without invading the domain of state governance. Perhaps Congress is disabled from using these enforcement powers to redefine state action by declaring state failure to act to be state action.
Perhaps not.Justice Black is not around to tell us, and his successors are mum on this point. But more recent Courts do exhibit a
willingness to defer to Congress when it acts in a fashion that is a
possible exercise of Reconstruction Amendment enforcement
powers. In Metro Broadcasting,Justice Brennan, for the Court, asserted that "deference was appropriate in light of Congress' institutional competence as the national legislature." 5 Here
emerged a new and wondrous fount of legislative authority, unbounded in its scope and embarrassingly capacious. Is it possible
32.
33.
34.
35.

400 U.S. 112 (1970).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 127.
Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 563, (1990).
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that the Court meant to suggest that any connection between
congressional legislation and an enumerated power of Congress
is mere superfluity? Or is this "institutional competence" simply
an added reason to defer to the congressional determination of
the scope of its authority? No demonstration of actual competence need be made, for Congress possesses an institutional competence that is the result of its very existence. Surely this limitless
conception of the powers of Congress was not what anyone had
in mind when the scheme of enumerated and delegated powers
was concocted out of the fertile brains ofJames Madison and his
cohorts.
It is hardly contestable that the strategy of limiting the scope of
federal authority was the original conception of the founding
generation. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 84, argued
against the inclusion of a Bill of Rights on the ground that "[t] hey
would contain various exceptions to powers which are not
granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted."3 6 James Madison observed, in Federalist No. 45, that
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with
which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend
to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and 37
the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
How wrong Madison must have been if the "institutional competence of Congress" is all that is now necessary to justify the exercise of congressional power.
Despite the best of intentions, the original scheme of a central
government of legally bounded authority has all but disappeared."8 Perhaps the complex network of relationship and dependence that describes the modern polity and economy
inevitably mandated some considerable accretion of federal
power. Perhaps the seeming plasticity of Commerce Clause doc36. THE FDERAusT No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
37. THE FEDERALsT No. 45 at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
38. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the AdministrativeState, 107 Htv. L. REv. 1231
(1994) (providing a useful exposition of this phenomenon).
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trine in the pre-1987 era undermined the legitimacy of legally
enforceable federalism limits, although, if so, it is odd that the
Court's vigorous application of the equally malleable concepts of
equal protection and due process has not yet undermined the
legitimacy of judicial review in those areas. Perhaps it is merely
the result of the Supreme Court's abdication of its constitutional
responsibilities in the face of a hostile and popular President.
Whatever the answer, the traditional restraints of legally enforceable federalism have been carted off to the legal antique shop,
leaving only a few and pallid replicas in their place.
B. Judicially Created State Immunities from FederalLegislation
Another method by which the Court has sought to protect federalism is to create state immunities from federal regulation or
intervention. These immunities are of two types: "soft immunities" and "hard immunities."
Soft immunities are not entirely separate from the prior approach, since one way to divine the scope of a state's immunity is
by reference to the scope of the enumerated federal powers. If
this is all there is to it, however, a soft immunity approach is no
different from the foregoing discussion of the scope of enumerated powers. If there is any "immunity" aspect to soft immunity, it
lies in the assumption that there is some core of state sovereignty
that can be used as a departure point from which to measure the
proper extent of federal power. It is true that this assumption was
once very much at work in the Court's determination of the
scope of the commerce power, 9 but it no longer has any vitality
in the area. By contrast, there remain some areas of constitutional law in which this assumption is still alive. The Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment in Hans v. Louisiana40 as
instantiating an original constitutional understanding of state immunity from suit in federal court is an example of soft immunity,
although it has some conceptual fuzziness that makes that description necessarily qualified.
Hard immunities can be regarded as zones of authority in
which the federal enumerated powers exist but are suspended by
virtue of the state immunity. National League of Cities v. Usery4" is
the paradigmatic modem example of hard immunity. Both ver39. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
40. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
41. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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sions of the immunity strategy have surfaced in American constitutional law and merit brief discussion.
The judicial approach to the scope of the commerce power,
particularly during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, was heavily influenced by the soft immunity concept
of presuming some core of state sovereignty from which reasoning about the scope of federal power could begin. Hammer v.
Dagenhart is perhaps the paradigmatic example. Even though
Congress prohibited the interstate movement of articles of commerce manufactured by child labor, the Court found an outer
limit to the commerce power that was based almost entirely upon
suppositions about the proper sphere of state authority.
But there are more modern examples of soft immunity than
the thoroughly discredited approach of Hammer v. Dagenhart.
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is a particularly interesting
example. The intended meaning of the Eleventh Amendment
has been the subject of extended scholarly debate in recent
years," one effect of which is to cast considerable doubt on
whether the amendment was ever intended to serve as a general
fount.of state sovereign immunity from suit in the federal courts.
But, of course, that was the construction given to the Eleventh
Amendment by Justice Joseph Bradley, writing for the Court in
Hans v. Louisiana.The result has been the creation of a zone of
state immunity, although it is not an immunity that sweeps across
all the possible separate heads of federal legislative power. It is
now established that Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity under its enforcement powers granted in
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment4" and pursuant to its
42. See, e.g., CLYDEJACoBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972);
JOHN V. ORTH, THEJUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNiTED STATES: THe ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN
AMERICAN HisroRy (1987); Martha Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1978); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretationof the
Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Constructionof an Affirmative GrantofJurisdictionRather than a
ProhibitionAgainstJurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics,56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1261 (1989);
William A. Fletcher Exchange on the Eleventh Amendmen 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 117 (1990);
John Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83
COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment,
and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE LJ. 1 (1988); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fightingthe Words
of the Eleventh Amendmen 102 HARv. L REV. 1342 (1989); William P. Marshall, The Diversity
Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1372 (1989);
Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHr. L REv.
61 (1989); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case,
98 HARv. L. REV. 61 (1984).
43. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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authority to regulate interstate commerce. 4 4 Beyond that, however, all bets are off. The Eleventh Circuit has recently concluded, in Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida,45 that Congress lacks
abrogation authority under the Indian Commerce Clause,
although its reasons for so concluding are a blend of National
League of Cities style hard immunity and Justice O'Connor's new
process federalism.
When Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,4 6
it sought to establish a framework for resolution of conflicts between states and Indian tribes over the increasingly common
practice of Indian tribes establishing gambling operations on
their reserved lands. A subsection of the Act provides Indian
tribes a remedy in federal court if states fail to enter into good
faith negotiations concerning establishment of a compact governing Indian gaming. 4 7 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the
Supreme Court
has allowed federal jurisdiction over states only when the
states partake in an activity typical of private individuals...
[or] when the state's conduct is outside the typical realm of
state authority. As negotiations with tribes certainly are not
outside that realm of state authority, the principles of federalism and sovereign immunity exemplified in the Eleventh
Amendment
prevent Congress from abrogating the states'
48
immunity.
The rationale seems tinctured with the distinction, repudiated in
Garcia,between the "traditional" or "governmental" activities of a
state and its "commercial" or "proprietary" activities,4 9 but it is
possible that the real rationale for decision is the view, expressed
by Justice O'Connor in New York v. United States, that Congress
may not issue mandates to the states to govern in a particular
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994).
25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988).
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (1994).
Seminole Tribe of Florida,11 F.3d at 1028.

49. But note that the Supreme Court continues to observe a similar such distinction
when it exempts state activity from the scrutiny of the dormant, or negative, Commerce
Clause whenever the state is a "market-participant" rather than a market regulator. See,

e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) ("The basic distinction ... between
States as market participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and sound
law."); South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984) ("[T]he
market-participant doctrine... allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the
market in which it is a participant, but... [it] may not impose conditions ... that have a
substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market."). There is no post-Garcia
indication that the Court intends to repudiate the market-participant doctrine.
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fashion. It may be that Seminole Tribe of Florida is in fact an attempt by the Court of Appeals to guard the autonomous process
of state governance. As in New York, Congress might regulate directly by preempting contrary state law, but it may not tell the
states to enter into a compact and subject them to suit in federal
court if they do not. Thus, even the best current example of soft
immunity turns out to be laced with elements of hard immunity
and with process federalism. Perhaps then there is no such thing
as pure soft immunity.
National League of Cities is the classic case of hard immunity.-5
When Congress extended the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1966
to apply to state schools and hospitals, a divided Supreme Court
in Maryland v. Wirtz5 ' upheld congressional power to do so, rejecting the argument that the commerce power "must yield to
state sovereignty in the performance of governmental functions."5 2 When Congress exercises a constitutionally "delegated
power," said the Court, it "may override countervailing state interests whether those be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' in character."53 But this construct was squarely repudiated
in National League of Cities. Not only did the Court expressly overrule Maryland v. Wirtz, it noted "that there are limits upon the
power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce."5 4 National League of Cities sought to find those limits in
the distinction between a state's exercise of its "governmental"
powers from its performance of merely "proprietary" functions
but, as the Court in Garcia noted when it overturned National
League of Cities, that distinction proved to be "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice."5 5
The conventional wisdom is that Garciavested in the national
political process virtually complete control over the extent to
which Congress might use its delegated powers to displace state
sovereignty. That is a misreading. Garcia was premised on the
principle that, in general, "[s] tate sovereign interests.., are...
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

It has, of course, since been overruled by Garcia.
392 U.S. 183 (1968).
Id. at 195.
Id.
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842.
Garcia,469 U.S. at 546.
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the federal system ... ,"
" Those safeguards consist entirely of the
fact that Congress is a congeries of legislators elected by the people of the various states. Thus, the states' interests are protected
by the fact that federal legislation is the product of state representatives. 57 Yet even in Garcia itself, the Court acknowledged
that federalism was not to be entrusted entirely to the political
process, for it left open the possibility that
[a] ny substantive restraint on the exercise of [Article I, section
8] powers must find its justification in the procedural nature
of [the national political process], and it must be tailored to
compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather58 than to dictate a "sacred province of state
autonomy."
A fair amount of case law has squeezed through this opening,
with the result that the Court seems to envision several different
ways in which those failings might manifest themselves. Initially,
the Court sought only to lend more precision to the "possible
failings in the national political process" that might meritjudicial
intervention in the name of federalism. In South Carolina v.
Baker,5 9 the Court rejected South Carolina's contention that Congress had stretched its commerce power too far by eliminating
the tax exemption on interest received from state bearer bonds,
thus effectively prohibiting state governments from issuing
bearer bonds. The Court acknowledged that "Garcia left open
the possibility that some extraordinary defects in the national
political process might render congressional regulation of state
activities invalid," although in doing so it suggested that a failure
of the national political process might inhere in a state's deprivation "of any right to participate in the national political process"
or as a result of a state's being "singled out in a way that left it
politically isolated and powerless." 0 These limits are limits of
substance. In the unlikely event that Congress were to exclude an
entire state's congressional delegation, 6 1 any legislation that fell
with peculiar impact upon that state would presumptively be invalid. But if the Congress simply decided that since Nevada is
rather barren and its underground already badly polluted by nu56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 552.
See id. at 550-54.
Id. at 554 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)).
485 U.S. 505 (1988).

60. Id. at 512.

61. It probably could not. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969).
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clear tests it ought to be the sole national repository for nuclear
waste, would that decision be one that singled out Nevada in
such a way as to render it politically isolated and powerless? The
Baker Court suggests a substantive limit; is this it?
In Gregory v. Ashcrofl, 2 the Court did not reach the constitutional issue of whether Congress could prohibit Missouri from
forcing its appointed judges to retire at a specified age; rather,
the Court concluded that in passing the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act 3 Congress had not sought to bar the Missouri
mandatory retirement policy because there was no unmistakably
clear manifestation of a congressional intent to interfere with the
judgment of the Missouri polity regarding the age qualifications
of its appointed judges.6 4 The Court fashioned the rule that Congress may use its delegated powers to "upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers" 5 only when its
intention to do so is made "unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute."6 6 The Court declared that its requirement of a
"plain statement" of congressional intent to intervene in state affairs was required by Garcia's apparent consignment of federalism to the political arena:
[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the
political process the protection of the States against intrusive
exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be
absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise.
"[T]o give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere
congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for
law-makin , on which Garcia relied to protect states'
interests."
Moreover, the Court in Gregory plainly intimated that if Congress
had unequivocally expressed its intent to bar mandatory retirement of state judges it would have exceeded its constitutional authority. "IT]he authority of the people of the States to determine
their most important government officials... lies at 'the heart of
representative government,' [and] ... is a power reserved to the
States under the Tenth Amendment and guaranteed them by"
62. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.
64. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-469.
65. Id. at 460.
66. Id. (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))).
67. Id. at 464 (quoting LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIunoNAL LAw 480 (2d ed.
1988)).
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the Guarantee Clause.6" Although the Constitution expressly
carves out some exceptions from this principle, most notably via
the Fourteenth Amendment, "the authority of the people of the
States to determine the qualifications of their government officials may be inviolate" from congressional invasion via the Commerce Clause.69
This plain statement rule was not created in a vacuum; it is
derived, as the Gregory Court acknowledged, from a similar such
requirement imposed upon Congress when it seeks to abrogate
state immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment,70 or
when Congress assertedly pre-empts the "historic powers of the
States,"7' 1 or when Congress intends to enforce the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment upon states. 72 The result of the Gregory v. Ashcroft plain statement rule is that aspects of the soft immunity approach have crept back into the post-Garcia
jurisprudence. In order to determine when the "usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers" has been altered, it is
necessary to start from some original conception of the scope of
those powers. The inquiry is not merely historical, for the Court
in Gregory noted that the provision at issue in that case-whether
Congress had denied to the states the power to force appointed
judges to retire-"goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by
the States; it is a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity. Through the structure of its government, and the
character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign." 73 The plain statement rule is one
which forces Congress to act with unmistakable clarity whenever
it wishes to displace the core of sovereignty of the states. Up to
this point the rule is simply procedural, another etiquette directive to Congress requiring that the states' sovereignty be gobbled
up only in a precisely ritualized manner. But the plain statement
rule only operates when the substance of the congressional ac68. Id. at 463 (quoting Bernal v. Fainter,467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984)).
69. Id. at 464.
70. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
71. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
72. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) ("Be-

cause such legislation imposes congressional policy on a State involuntarily, and because
it often intrudes on traditional state authority, we should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Gregay, 501 U.S. at 470 ("[T]he Pennhurst rule looks much like the plain
statement rule we apply today.").
73. Gregory, 501 U.S. 460.
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tion is one which bites into the core of state sovereignty, a core
that can only be known by defining it independently of the federal power seeking to operate upon it. The triggering of the rule
is a form of soft immunity; its application is a form of process
federalism.
The various devices used by the Court-the notion of "extraordinary defects" in the political process or the plain statement rule-are an attempt to preserve some modicum of legally
enforceable federalism for the Court. Even in its ardor to commit
the issue of the proper scope of federal legislative power to the
political process, the Court has preserved the possibility of substantive and legally enforceable limits to correct palpable failings
in that process. The plain statement rule is softer, a legally enforceable procedural limit. But there is room in the interplay between these rules to pose some fascinating and hard questions.
Suppose that a federal administrative agency, plausibly acting
within the scope of its statutory authority, decides to promulgate
regulations that direct the states to act in a certain fashion. The
agency regulations are not commanded, or even reasonably certain to be inferred, from the governing statute. Given the demise
of the non-delegation doctrine, the agency is acting lawfully.
Given the Chevron rule ofjudicial deference to agency interpretation of regulatory statutes the agency's regulations are not subject to judicial review as beyond the agency's statutory
authority.7 4 The apparent result is that administrators, electorally
accountable to nobody, are free to command the states to alter
their practices, even in the absence of the required plain statement by Congress. A plain statement by the agency of its intent to
direct state behavior should not be sufficient, because the reason
for the plain statement rule is to ensure that the national political process of Congress is conscious of its decision to intrude
upon state sovereignty. There is no similar assurance of the consciousness of the national political process, consisting of state
representatives deciding the issue, when federal administrators
act pursuant to vaguely worded statutory authority. Is the agency
action barred because it is not a product of the national political
process, or is it infirm because it is a product of a failed political
74. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984) (holding that agencies must conform to any precisely discernible congressional
intent but that if the statute does not clearly resolve the "precise question at issue," courts
must accept any "reasonable" agency interpretation of the statute).
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process, or is the problem simply the procedural defect that Congress failed to make the required plain statement? Could that
procedural defect be cured by a congressional preface to the
vaguely worded governing statute that simply stated the congressional intent to "upset the usual constitutional balance of federal
and state powers" by vesting the agency with power to do so? In
the wake of Gregory and Baker the Court will be asked some version of these very questions.
Finally, despite the seeming sweep of Garcia's consignment to
the national political process of federalism limits upon congressional power, there do seem to be some remaining (and perhaps
isolated) substantive, legally enforceable, limits upon the exercise of congressional power. There is no doubt that Congress
controls the admission of new states into the Union, yet when it
has done so the newly admitted states are deemed to be admitted
on an equal footing with pre-existing states.7 5 In conformity with
this rule Congress has no power to insist that a newly admitted
state, as a condition of its admission, refrain from moving its capital.' 6 Nor could Congress compel one of the original thirteen
states to relocate its capital. 7 All this flows from the Court's conclusion that the congressional power to admit states is one that
comes with no strings attached.'" But could Congress assert its
power to regulate interstate commerce as a basis for requiring all
state capitals to be located in the most populous city in the state?
If there is no hard immunity left after Garcia,it would seem that
so long as Congress has acted explicitly and has not unfairly
picked on one state, it would be permissible so to act. That conclusion seems wrong instinctually, however, and, if so, it must because the states enjoy some hard immunity in this area. But if
they do, why should it matter a great deal whether the issue is the
expenditure of state money to relocate the capital on federal demand rather than the expenditure of state money to pay federally mandated overtime wages to police officers? The latter is
surely within the competence of Congress and may in reality be
of more fiscal and policy consequence than the physical location
75. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911). See also Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212 (1845).
76. See id. at 573-74.
77. See id. at 565.
78. But cf. Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 163 Ariz. 587, 790 P. 2d 242 (1990)
(unamendable provision of Arizona Constitution incorporating terms of congressional
act enabling Arizona's admission and which was required by Congress as a condition of
admission given effect as a matter of Arizona constitutional law).
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of the state's capital. Perhaps all this suggests that there is simply
no hard immunity of any kind left to the states. Perhaps it suggests that federalism limits are of a different coinage.
III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF "PROCESS FEDERALISM"

Process federalism is a device to retain some legally enforceable federalism limits upon the legislative powers of Congress
when Congress uses those powers to invade the processes of state
governance. It is both a recognition of the Court's preference for
the national political process as the primary determinant of the
scope of federal legislative power and the Court's hesitancy to
abandon all judicial control over the functioning of that process.
One might claim that the Court's process federalism is functionally analogous to the Court's retention of judicial control
over the scope of the Article I, section 8 powers of Congress:
both are severely attenuated but theoretically extant. There is,
however, an important difference. When essaying the scope of
the enumerated powers, the Court has generally been confronted with congressional attempts to regulate the activities of
the citizenry, and, by virtue of the preemptive effect of the
Supremacy Clause, displace the States as possible regulators. The
problem becomes more acute when Congress uses those powers
to regulate the States directly. Of course, NationalLeague of Cities
was a failed attempt to forge an immunity based on this distinction and, with its repudiation, one might reasonably suppose that
the distinction between the States and the citizenry is of no significance. But the Court has not been content to leave it at that.
Almost from the moment that Garciawas decided, the Court set
about devising doctrines to limit the discretion given Congress to
invade some zone of state autonomy. Whether these doctrines
are substantive barriers to congressional action, as suggested in
South Carolina v. Baker, 9 or whether they are primarily procedural, as was the case in Gregory v. Ashcroft,"0 they have combined
to limit both the mode and range of congressional action invasive of state autonomy.
These post-Garcia limits have coalesced into a third, and by far
the most currently robust, strategy of legally enforceable federalism. This strategy, process federalism, regards the constitutional
79. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
80. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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structure of federalism as implicitly mandating limits upon the
scope of the enumerated federal powers in order to prevent the
federal government from usurping the autonomous processes of
state governmental institutions. This strategy has been employed
for some time to curb the limits of federal judicial authority
(although the Court typically-but not always-refuses to recognize why it does what it does in this area) and with respect to
federal legislative authority, is developing under the tutelage of
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Its most current blossoming is in
New York v. United States.8 1
At issue in New York v. United States was the validity of three
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.82 In order to facilitate the disposal of radioactive waste, Congress in 1980 authorized states to negotiate
regional compacts that, once ratified by Congress, would permit
member states to share a common disposal site and deny access
to waste originating from non-member states."' Perhaps because
the original act provided neither inducements for the creation of
such compacts nor penalties for the failure to create compacts,
very few states entered into disposal compacts, and those compacts that were created involved the three existing disposal sites.
The 1985 amendments at issue in New York were the product of
a compromise between sited and unsited states fashioned by the
National Governors' Association and largely adopted by Congress. The amendments provided three combinations of incentives and penalties to spur the creation of compacts. Two of
these-a scheme of monetary incentives and another involving
access incentives-turned out to be constitutionally valid. The
monetary incentives involved congressional authorization of a
surcharge to be levied by sited states on waste originating from
out of state.8 4 The surcharge was then taxed by the federal government and spent in the form of payments to non-sited states
that had complied with various deadlines involved in the creation
of new disposal sites.8 5 The Court in New York regarded this
scheme as an unobjectionable use of the congressional power to
authorize states to discriminate in interstate commerce, to tax,
81. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
82. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j).
83. See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, § 4(a) (2) (B), 94
Stat. 3347-49 (1980).
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (1).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2).
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and to spend conditionally.8 6 The access incentives consisted of
congressional permission being given to sited states and compacts to deny access to waste originating from outside the sited
compact states.87 The Court regarded this scheme as a straightforward example of the "power of Congress to authorize the
States to discriminate against interstate commerce."8 8
The problem was the third scheme, which required states that
had failed to create a disposal site or to enter into a disposal compact to make a choice between either taking tide to all the waste
generated within the state, and consequently assuming liability
for all damages suffered by waste producers as a result of any
state tardiness in doing so, or to regulate the disposal of waste in
accord with congressionally specified instructions. 89 According to
Justice O'Connor, both the mandate to take title and assume liability, on the one hand, and the mandate to'enact waste disposal
regulations in conformity with congressional requires, on the
other, were beyond the power of Congress to accomplish. That
is,
[e]ither type of federal action would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and
would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's
division of authority between federal and state governments
...Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside
Congress' enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the
provision is inconsistent with the federal 90
structure of our Government established by the Constitution.
The heart of the Court's approach in New York is a distinction
between federal legislation which "subject[s] a State to the same
legislation applicable to private parties"9 1 and legislation which
operates "solely on the activities of the States."92 By reason of Garcia, the validity of the former is largely consigned to the national
political process; any judicial interference with that process is entirely procedural, e.g., the presence of the plain statement re86. See New York, 112 S. CL at 2425-2427 ("[This] step is an unexceptionable exercise of
Congress' power to authorize the States to burden interstate commerce.... [and] is thus
well within the authority of Congress under the Commerce and Spending Clauses.").
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(c); see also New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2416 (providing a summary
of the various penalties for States that fail to meet deadlines).
88. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2427.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (C).
90. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2428-29.
91. Id. at 2420.
92. Id. at 2441 (White, J.,dissenting).
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quired by Gregory,93 or limited to the weak substantive test
suggested by South Carolinav. Baker. 4 But when the federal legislation impinges only upon the activities of the States, a different
legally enforceable federalism limit applies: Congress may not
command the States to enact and enforce a particular regulatory
scheme.
In the course of registering his dissent in New York, Justice
White contended that this distinction, and the rule built upon it,
was both "insupportable and illogical."9 5 There is, however, more
doctrinal support for the rule than justice White admits and even
more than Justice O'Connor argues. The logic of the distinction
and the rule is more debatable.
A.

The DoctrinalRoots of Process Federalism

In their respective New York opinions, Justices O'Connor and
White debated whether the "commandeering" rule could be
fairly implied from Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Assn., Inc." and FERCv. Mississippi.9 7 Hodel involved the question
of whether Congress could use its commerce power to pre-empt
a field of activity-strip mining and reclamation of strip mined
land-that could also be subject to state regulation; it did not
involve an attempt by Congress to command states to impose regulations dictated by Congress. Justice White is correct that the
Hodel Court's statement that Congress may not "commandee [r]
the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program"9 " "was classic
dicta."99
FERC, on the other hand, is a slightly different matter. In the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), °° Congress required the States to consider federal standards in the
course of regulating public utilities within state jurisdiction.'
The court in FERC upheld the validity of PURPA because it did
not constitute "a federal command to the States to promulgate
93. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
94. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
95. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2441.
96. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
97. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
98. Hodel 452 U.S. at 288.
99. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2442 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Hode 452 U.S. at 288).
100. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq.)
101. See 16 U.S.C. § 2622.
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and enforce laws and regulations."" °2 Although Justice White
sought to make a great deal out of the fact that the FERC Court
also noted that "there are instances where the Court has upheld
federal statutory structures that in effect directed state decisionmakers to take or refrain from taking certain actions," 10 3 the
authority cited by the Court in FERC was Fy v. United States,11 4 a
case upholding federal legislation which imposed wage limits on
both private and public employers. In that respect, Fry is simply
another version of a run-of-the-mill Fair Labor Standards Act
case, like Garcia,which involves congressional regulation of employment terms of both private and public employers.
This debate, relevant though it may be, misses a larger point. A
set of principles equally relevant to the distinction and rule at
issue in New York is not to be found in slivers of dicta and implications from prior holdings involving the operation of the legislative powers of the federal government, but rather in the
voluminous doctrines that, in the name of federalism, operate to
confine the scope of the federal judicial power. The real question debated in New York is whether any legally enforceable federalism limit applies when Congress legislates only with respect to
the governance processes of a state. As FERC, Hodel, and New York
demonstrate, the issue is relatively new with respect to federal
attempts to dictate the processes of state legislative deliberation.
But the problem is, if not old hat, at least familiar when considering the extent to which either Congress or the federal courts may
command state officials to carry out federal mandates. A brief
examination of these principles of judicial federalism will add
needed context to the New York debate.
Congress may enact laws which are enforceable in state courts.
Testa v. Katt,"°5 which arguably required states to open their
courthouse doors to entertain federal causes of action when
analogous claims premised on state law would be heard, is the
principal example. Such legislation involves, as Justice O'Connor
noted, "congressional regulation of individuals, not congressional requirements that States regulate." 0 6 Moreover, judges, as
expositors of law, are peculiarly bound by the strictures of the
102. FERQ 456 U.S. at 762.
103. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2442 (White, J.) (quoting FERC, 456 U.S. at 762).
104. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
105. 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (upholding a federal statute requiring state courts to adjudicate claims under a federal statute).
106. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2430.
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Supremacy Clause's explicit requirement that "the Judges in
every State shall be bound" by paramount federal law.' 0 7 To the
extent that a state desires to deny individuals a state forum for
resolution of federal claims when Congress has expressed a contrary desire, the state's policy preferences are pre-empted just as
surely as if the state desired to select a minimum wage at variance
with that set by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.
Federal courts may also order state officials to comply with federal law. That proposition is little more than a restatement of the
Supremacy Clause. A Governor's refusal to extradite a fugitive to
a sister state in violation of federal law requiring extradition is no
less susceptible to federal judicial correction' s than would be a
state legislature's attempt to prohibit the operation of federal law
within its borders. In neither case, however, is there an attempt
to compel the state to alter its own internal governance processes
to conform to federal commands.
Even more germane to the question of whether federal attempts to control state governance processes are constitutionally
improper are the congeries of supposedly prudential doctrines,
rooted in principles of "comity and federalism," °9 that restrain
the federal judicial power from interfering with the independent
governance processes of the States. Younger abstention is a vivid
example.
Youngerv. Harris1 ° and its companion cases"' held that, in the
words of Justice Hugo Black, "Our Federalism ....
a system in
107. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
108. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987) (holding that federal courts
may enjoin unconstitutional action by state officials, including the refusal to extradite
fugitives). Cf Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Assn., 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (holding that state law cannot interfere with preferential fishing rights given Indian tribes by federal treaties); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91
(1972) (applying federal common law to abate a public nuisance in Illinois waterways
caused by four Wisconsin cities); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that a state
cannot deter federal enforcement of desegregation orders regardless of its individual position on the issue).
109. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972).
110. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
111. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69 (1971) (holding that a federal litigant may
not obtain declaratory relief if he has already initiated a state proceeding where he can
raise the constitutional issue in question); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) (a federal
court is not permitted to intervene with an injunction where no immediate irreparable
injury was present pursuant to the enforcement of an Illinois statute); Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82 (1971) (holding that federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions is inappropriate unless there are extraordinary circumstances present); Dyson v.
Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) (holding that unless there is the possibility of irreparable harm
with a pending state criminal prosecution, there can be no injunctive relief); Byrne v.

No. 11

Etiquette Tips

which there is ... a proper respect for state functions " ' prevented federal courts in most instances from enjoining state
criminal prosecutions. Although the Younger Court made no
claim that abstention was constitutionally required, its discussion
of the applicable principles of "comity" that compelled abstention proceeded from constitutional norms."n The Court emphasized that
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments ....[and] the belief that the National Government
to
will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free
14
perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
The Court's implicit recognition of a constitutional barrier to the
exercise of federal judicial power in a manner that would block
the functioning of independent state processes of governance
may be seen clearly by noting the contours of the Younger
doctrine.
To begin, in Hicks v. Miranda,"5 the Court concluded that
where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before
any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place
court, [Younger abstention] should apply in full
in the federal
6
force."1

Younger abstention as refined by Hicks can usefully be thought of
as the Court's way of defining the frontier between federal and
state judicial authority in the context of state criminal proceedings. Direct interference in such proceedings, or the prevention
of their commencement, is thought by the Court to be an unconKaralexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971) (judgment vacated and remanded for failure to meet the
Younger requirement of irreparable injury).
112. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
113. See id. at 43-48.
114. Id. at 44. See also IAURENCE H. T~iBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTiONAL LAW, § 3-30, at
203-04 n.9 (2d ed. 1988) ("it is certainly clear... that the most basic underpinning of the
Youngerdoctrine is not any special equity concept but, rather, a federalism-based notion of
comity.") (emphasis in original); Ann Althouse, How to Build a SeparateSphere: Federal Courts
and State Power, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1485, 1488-89, 1531-34 (1987) (at the core of the
Younger doctrine is a concern for protecting the role of state courts as independent adjudicators of state and federal constitutional issues).
115. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
116. Id. at 349. The Hicks rule has been interpreted by some of the leading commentators in the federal jurisdiction field to mean that "once a state criminal prosecution is
filed, federal courts may not decide issues properly before the state court, unless it has
already done so..." 17A CHARLEs A. W~iHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACarCE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 4253, at 228 (2d ed. 1982) (quoting Note, Federal Court Intervention in State CriminalLaw
Proceedings When Charges Are Brought After Filing of the Federal Complaint,37 OHIO ST. LJ.
205, 214-15 (1976)).

HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 18

stitutional interference with the retained sovereign prerogatives
17
of the States to maintain independent governance processes.'
Moreover, Younger abstention is not limited to state criminal
proceedings. In Huffman v. Pursue,Ltd.,"' the Court first guardedly extended the scope of Younger abstention to state civil proceedings "akin to a criminal prosecution."" 9 In Middlesex County
Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n., 120 the Court extended
the Younger policies to encompass "noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved." 12 However, in
Juidice v. Vail,'2 2 the Court noted that it was saving "for another
day" the broader question of whether Younger applies to all civil
proceedings. 23 But ten years later, the Court in Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc.124 applied Younger abstention to foreclose a federal
forum for Texaco's claim that Texas' judgment lien and appeal
bond requirements in civil actions violated its federal constitutional rights. In concurrence, Justice Blackmun indicated that
Pennzoil broadened the scope of Younger sufficiently to apply
"whenever any state proceeding is ongoing, no matter how attenuated the State's interests ....
2
In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans,126 the Court refused to uphold Younger abstention in a case
challenging the validity of the New Orleans City Council's refusal
to reimburse fully a utility for costs incurred in the construction
of a nuclear power plant, despite a contrary determination by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The Court conceded
that utility rate regulation is "one of the most important [state]
functions" 2 7 but nevertheless found Younger abstention inapplicable because the state interest implicated was neither a "civil enforcement proceeding[ ]" nor an "order[ ] . . . uniquely in
117. To the extent that there are federal statutory or constitutional objections to the
manner in which the States are exercising their sovereign authority, and those objections
have been resolved erroneously by the state courts themselves, the Supremacy Clause preserves to the federal courts the power to review and revise such determinations.
118. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
119. Id. at 604.
120. 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
121. Id. at 432.
122. 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (applying Younger abstention to a case where appellees had
the opportunity to have their federal claims heard in state contempt charge proceedings).
123. Id. at 336 n.13.
124. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
125. Id. at 27 (Blackmun.J., concurring).
126. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
127. Id. at 365 (quoting Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Se'v
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983)).
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furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial
functions." 2 '
New OrleansPublic Service reveals that Younger abstention is truly

an exercise in defining the constitutional limits of the federal
judicial power. By identifying two categories of civil cases in
which Younger abstention should apply, the Court articulated the
core principle of Younger abstention in civil matters: States,
through their judicial systems, are entitled to be free from federal interference in the process by which they fashion and enforce state law. The identified categories reflect a recognition
that the States possess a core of sovereign judicial authority with
which the federal courts may not interfere. Of course, the substance of such state determinations, at least when the result impinges upon federal statutory or constitutional authority, is not
beyond federal judicial review. Younger abstention merely reaffirms that a state's process is insulated from federal interference,
that so long as the States do not violate paramount federal law,
they retain authority to enforce their chosen public policies and
to control the processes of their own judicial systems.
The constitutional foundations of the Younger doctrine are fur-

ther buttressed by an examination of the intersection between
the Anti-Injunction Act 29 and Younger abstention. The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court
proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 3 ' In Mitchum v. Foster,'' the Court concluded that a federal court in a section 1983 action may enjoin a
state court. The Court construed section 1983 to impliedly contain sufficient "express authorization" of Congress to escape the
statutory bar of the Anti-Injunction Act.' 3 2 While it may have rea128. Id. at 368.
129. 28 U.S.C. 2283 (1988) (a court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.).
130. Id.The Anti-Injunction Act has been a continuous limitation upon the power of
the federal courts to invade state sovereignty since its enactment as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1793. Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. at 334, 335 (1793) ("a writ of injunction
[shall not] be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state.") This provision has been
codified as Rev. Stat. § 720 (1878);Judicial Code § 265 (1911); 28 U.S.C. § 379 (1940);
and finally, in 1948, at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
131. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
132. Id. at 240-41. This finding in section 1983 of an " 'implied' express exception" to
the bar of the Anti-Injunction Act has been labeled a "bizarre contortion[ I" and "an oxymoron if ever there was one." Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the
Limits of theJudidalFunction, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 87 (1984).
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soned illogically as a matter of statutory construction,a 3s the
Court was quite explicit in its view that the statutorily memorialized desires of Congress do not "qualify in any way the principles
of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal
court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding." i" 4 As a result, even if a plaintiff states a claim under section 1983, the
Court's view is that Younger abstention must apply, even though
the section 1983 claim is one which would entitle a federal court
35
to enjoin a state court under the Anti-Injunction Act.'
This is a state of affairs that has been criticized by one abstention foe as "an effective reversal of the congressional decision to
make section 1983 an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act."' 36
In this view,
the combined effect.., of... Younger and Mitchum is that the
federal judiciary has arrogated to itself the authority to decide
when to enjoin state court proceedings. It is difficult to imagine a starker
illustration of judicial usurpation of legislative
37
authority.'
But if Younger abstention is treated as compelled by the Constitution, the interplay between Younger, Mitchum, and the Anti-Injunction Act becomes more understandable.
In the constitutional view of Younger abstention, Mitchum is
simply a case of statutory construction. It may be that the Court
in Mitchum erred in its construction of both section 1983 and the
Anti-Injunction Act, but that is of no significance to the constitutional issues. If Younger is a constitutional decision, it makes perfectly good sense that the Court would hold that, even though a
federal plaintiff has stated a claim under section 1983 (thus escaping the statutory bar of the Anti-Injunction Act), the constitutionally mandated principle of Younger requires the federal court
to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. That is precisely what the
Court has done in such cases as Pennzoil.l3 1 If a federal court in a
section 1983 action has the power to enjoin a state court (because
Congress has authorized it to do so) but may not exercise that
power due to principles of "equity, comity and federalism," it ap133. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsiderea; 44 U. Cit. L.
Rav. 717, 733-39 (1977); Redish, Abstention, supra note 132, at 86-87.
134. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243 (emphasis added). This principle was emphatically reaffirmed in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
135. See, e.g., Pennzoi 481 U.S. at 10-11.
136. Redish, Abstention, supra note 132, at 88.
137. Id.
138. 481 U.S. at 10-11.
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pears that something necessarily exists which vetoes congressional attempts to exercise its powers. That "something" may be
simply an exercise ofjudicial prudence. However, given the principle that the federal courts "have no more right to decline the
exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given, 1a9 it seems far more likely that it is not judicial prudence, arguably "treason to the constitution," 14 ° but instead ajudicial recognition that Congress is acting beyond its delegated
powers or, what is virtually the same thing, a recognition that
retained state sovereignty occupies a sphere that, in some instances, trumps congressional power.
The constitutional view of Younger also explains the often criticized rigidity of Younger abstention. The Court has declared that
"[w]here a case is properly within [the scope of Younger abstention], there is no discretion to grant injunctive relief."' 4 ' Critics of
Younger abstention typically charge that "[t]his rigidity has eliminated the discretionary balancing at the heart of equity." 4 ' But
Younger abstention is not simply an equitable doctrine. Rather,
Younger composes a portion of the hard outer shell of Article III;
federal jurisdiction cannot expand beyond its confines. Equity
cannot operate to expand constitutional authority; thus, it makes
more sense to regard Younger as rooted in the Constitution, not
in principles of equity. Younger abstention is more than a monument to customary norms of comity and federalism; it is an embodiment of the Constitution's tacit postulates of twin
sovereignties.
However forceful the Younger doctrine may be to establish the
principle that Congress may not dictate to the States the form of
their governance, it was never alluded to in New York v. United
States. That omission undoubtedly occurred because Younger is,
despite evidence to the contrary, still regarded as having nothing
to do with constitutional limits upon the power of the federal
government to control the processes of state governance. For the
139. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
140. Id. See also Redish, Abstention, supra note 132, at 76 (arguing for the abolition of
judge-made abstention); Donald L. Doernberg, You Can Lead a Horse to Water...: The
Supreme Court's Refusal to Allow the Exercise of OriginalJurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40
CAsE W. RFs. L. REv. 999, 1016-21 (1989-90) (criticizing the federal judiciaries jurisdictional abdication under abstention doctrines).
141. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816
n.22 (1976) (emphasis added).
142. Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine:Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55
TEx. L. REv. 1141, 1143 (1977).
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New York majority to have used Younger to bolster the process federalism limit announced in New York they would have been
forced to acknowledge Youngers constitutional underpinnings.
The Court may have been unwilling to do so out of fear that a
clear recognition of Youngeis status as a constitutional limit on
federal judicial power would prevent Congress from ever conferring on the federal courts the power to enjoin ongoing state judicial proceedings.
But Younger might be thought of as having a constitutional status not unlike the Dormant Commerce Clause: In the absence of
congressional action, the Court's judgments concerning the implied limitations of the Commerce Clause are provisional.
Younger might be thought of as possessing a similar quality: In the
absence of some legitimate and exceedingly explicit congressional directive to oust the state courts of jurisdiction, Younger
abstention is a provisional constitutional judgment of the courts.
Even so conceived, Younger is nevertheless constitutionally
grounded, and its constitutional foundation is similar to the process federalism of New York. New York-style process federalism permits Congress to oust the States' legislative authority by preempting a field, but until and unless Congress clearly does so,
Congress is barred from accomplishing the same end by the
more indirect route of compelling the States so to act.
Acknowledging Younger's constitutional pedigree, in whatever
form, may have been just a bit much for the Court to swallow at
one sitting, but it does not prevent the family of constitutional
commentators from noting the relationship between Justice
O'Connor's New York-style process federalism and Justice Hugo
Black's Younger version of "Our Federalism."
The ability of states to control their own processes of governance, free from federal interference, is also protected by the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine. That is, "from
the time of its foundation [the United States Supreme Court] has
adhered to the principle that it will not review judgments of state
courts that rest on adequate and independent state grounds."' 4 3
Unfortunately, the Court has never provided a definitive answer
to whether the doctrine is constitutionally required, statutorily
compelled, or, perhaps, merely prudential. This is partly because

143. Herb v. Pitcaim, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
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Congress has never seen fit to bestow the Court with jurisdiction
over matters of pure state law.
In Murdock v. City of Memphis,'4 4 the Court treated a Reconstruction-era amendment to the Judiciary Act of 1789 as lacking a
sufficiently clear statement of intent to confer jurisdiction over
state law issues, thus avoiding the question of whether Congress
possessed the constitutional authority to do so. 145 Such modem
commentators as Professor Laurence Tribe assert that a congressional attempt to confer jurisdiction over issues of pure state law
would violate constitutionally rooted "principles of state autonomy."' 46 Similarly, Professor Deborah Merritt argues that, unless
the States "retain sufficient autonomy to establish and maintain
their own forms of government," 4 7 they are deprived of the federal government's pledge to "guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government.' 14 Were the Court to
decide issues of state law, the States, to the extent the Court actually did so, would be stripped of the autonomy to fashion their
own law. Of course, ever since Luther v. Borden,149 the Guarantee
Clause has been treated as nonjusticiable, but it is intriguing to
note that in New York v. United StatesJustice O'Connor, along with
five other members of the Court, hinted that the Guarantee
Clause might be justiciable on just such a theory as Professor
Merritt has proposed.'
B.

The Logic of Process Federalism

In his New York dissent, Justice White contended that the distinction between federal legislation applicable only to states and
such legislation applicable to both private entities and states was
"illogical" and "not based on any defensible theory."' 5 ' To Justice
White
[a] n incursion on state sovereignty hardly seems more constitutionally acceptable if the federal statute that 'commands' spe144. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
145. See id.
at 619, 630.
146. TRBE, supra note 114, at § 3-24, 163.
147. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. R-v. 1, 2 (1988) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause in the
U.S. Constitution includes a principle of federalism and implies a modest restraint on
federal power to interfere with state autonomy.")
148. U.S. CON5T. art. IV, § 4.
149. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
150. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2432-33.
151. Id. at 2441.
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cific action also applies to private parties. The alleged
diminution in state authority over its own affairs is not any less
because 52the federal mandate restricts the activities of private
parties.
The flaw in this objection is that legislation directed generally
at all persons almost certainly lacks any command that the States
exercise their independent governance processes in a particular
fashion. A statute like that at issue in Fry v. United States' 5 5-imposing a wage freeze on public and private employers alikedoes not direct the state's legislative process to do so; it prohibits
the state as employer, in common with other employers, from
raising wages except as permitted by Congress. Quite a different
situation would be presented if Congress instead directed the
States to enact legislation freezing all wages within the state at
their existing levels. Although the result is identical-wages are
frozen-the mechanism for doing so is vastly different in the two
cases. In the first, Congress is clearly seen as the body articulating
public policy under its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce. In the second, Congress is far less clearly perceived as the legislative actor; rather, it is acting as a sort of
legislative commander-in-chief, issuing orders for execution by
subordinates. The nominal manufactory of public policy, the
state legislature, is in fact a mere subaltern with no discretion but
only an obligation to obey.
Permitting Congress to command state legislative action distorts the accountability of public officials. State legislators are apt
to be held electorally accountable for actions with respect to
which they have no discretion; and conversely, members of Congress are apt to escape electoral accountability for policy decisions that are entirely their own. Electoral accountability is an
important cog in the elaborate mechanism of representative democracy. Filing off a few teeth from that gear has the effect of
throwing the entire works into disorder. As Justice O'Connor put
it:
[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate,
the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished. If the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that making provision for the disposal of radioactive
waste is in their best interest, they may elect state officials who
share their view. That view can always be preempted under the
152. Id.
153. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
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Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the national view, but in
such a case it is the Federal Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials
that suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be
detrimental or unpopular. But where the Federal Government
directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will
bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials
who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated
from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected
state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of

the local electorate
in matters not pre-empted by federal
54
regulation.'
Perhaps the electorate would be sophisticated enough to see
through the charade of federal compulsion upon the state legislative process. Indeed, elites have a tendency to assume that the
people are dumber than they actually are. But even if the people
are able correctly to perceive that what appears to be state policy
is actually dictated by Congress, there is another, and even more
insidious way in which federal compulsion upon the state legislative process would destroy the principle of electoral
accountability.
With the virtual demise of the non-delegation doctrine, Congress is free to create broad statutory guidelines and bestow upon
unelected administrators the power to formulate precise rules
governing behavior. Congress is thus arguably free to enact a statute that, in quite explicit terms, empowers a cabinet Secretary to
promulgate regulations that command the States to create implementing legislation. The hand of Congress is now even more obscured, further undermining electoral accountability, by vesting
in an unelected federal administrator the judgment concerning
precisely what the States should be commanded to do. That administrator may in theory be accountable to Congress or the
President, though the level of real accountability will vary markedly in practice, but the administrator has almost no accountability to the courts with respect to her interpretation of the statute
she administers.' 5 5 This congressional command by administrative proxy is far more likely to escape the critical scrutiny of
154. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
155. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837,842-44 (1984) (agencies must conform to any precisely discernible congressional intent, but if the statute does not clearly
resolve the "precise question at issue" courts must accept any "reasonable" agency interpretation of the statute).

HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 18

either the federal or the state electorate, badly damaging the
mechanism of representative democracy.
Process federalism not only prevents erosion of the principle
of electoral accountability, it also helps to ensure that politically
enforceable federalism will actually work. Given the reality that
the limits of federal legislative authority are largely governed by
the political process, and only loosely overseen by courts, it is
imperative that the political process operate without distortions
that would render it an unreliable caretaker of federalism. The
Court was already attentive to those possibilities, as evidenced by
its South Carolinav. Baker obiter dictum concerning "extraordinary
defects" in the political process and the plain statement rule announced in Gregory v. Ashcroft. The New York prohibition upon
federal compulsion of state legislative processes is, in one sense,
merely an extension of that concern.
For the national political process to remain a reliable custodian of legislative federalism, the workings of that process must
be kept strictly accountable to the people. Indirect methods of
legislation are inimical to that aspiration. Thus, it makes sense
for Congress to be able to work its will directly, even if it entails
displacing state regulatory authority and regulating the States in
the same fashion as other actors, while nevertheless being unable
to force the States to do its work for it.
The process federalism that has developed in the aftermath of
Garciais not, as Justice White would characterize it, without foundation in precedent or connection to constitutional logic.
Rather, it is very much related to legally enforceable federalism
limits applicable to the federal judicial power. The nature of
those judicial federalism limits is remarkably similar to post-Garcia process federalism, and the long existence of legally enforceable judicial federalism limits lends strong support to the
precedential pedigree of contemporary legislative process federalism. Moreover, given the pronounced preference in modern
constitutional law for politically enforceable limits on the scope
of federal legislative power, there are sound reasons for the
emergence of process federalism to prevent distortions of the
political process, which is relied upon to assess the relative merits
of a more centralized or more decentralized version of
federalism.
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SOME IMPLICATIONS OF PROCESS FEDERALISM

The premises upon which the Court in New York constructed
the latest phase of legislative process federalism suggest the likelihood of both further developments in process federalism and
provide reason to consider alterations in existing doctrines of legally enforceable federalism. There are two major premises underlying process federalism.
First, process federalism is thought to ensure greater electoral
accountability of the people's representatives in both the federal
and state governments. 5 ' As we have seen, an aspect of this rationale is also the concept that process federalism operates to
ensure, in ways other than electoral accountability alone, that the
national political process, to which the constitutionally mandated
structure of federalism has been largely consigned, operates in a
fashion that is responsive to federalism concerns.'"
Second, federalism is thought to be a positive virtue as well as
constitutionally required. Justice O'Connor has described the
"federalist structure ofjoint sovereigns" as one which
preserves to the people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it
allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by putting
the States in competition for a mobile citizenry ... Perhaps

the principal benefit of the 158
federalist system is a check on
abuses of government power.
But the
task [of the Court] would be the same even if one could prove
that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists
not of devising our preferred system of government, but of
understandingI 59and applying the framework set forth in the
Constitution. r

156. See text accompanying notes 154-155 supra.
157. See text accompanying notes 59-78 supra.
158. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). See also, Merritt, supra note 147, at
3-10 (outlining the values of federalism that have survived over 200 years: (1) the ability of
state governments to check the federal government, (2) the ability of state governments
to draw citizens into the political process, (3) the political and cultural diversity of state
governments, and (4) the ability of the States to experiment without consequence to the
rest of the nation); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the Founders'Design,54
U. CH. L. Ray. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987) (discussing the intellectual justification for
federalism).
159. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2418.
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Accordingly, process federalism is claimed to be necessary to insure the continuation of a federalism that really exists-one in
which states possess ample substantive authority to make differing policy choices on issues that do not adversely implicate constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties.
There are different implications that flow from each of these
separate premises. The first premise and its corollary proposition
suggest the likelihood of further refinements in the emerging
doctrine of a legislative process federalism. The second premise
implies a far broader role for the Court in enforcing federalism
principles as a matter of substantive limitation upon the federal
legislative power, rather than treating legally enforceable federalism as primarily, if not exclusively, a process phenomenon.
A.

PredictableFuture Elements of Legislative Process Federalism

Given the Court's embrace of the national political process as
the principal arbiter of legislative federalism, it is hardly surprising that the Court has continued to use legally enforceable federalism as a device to ensure that the political process is in fact
responsive to state concerns. The plain statement rule of Gregory
attempts to do so by making sure that Congress is aware of federalism concerns when it enacts legislation impinging upon the
States. The New York commandeering rule, built upon the premise of electoral accountability, is of the same pattern. These rationales are highly instructive to the problem of federal agency
action purporting to bind the States.
Administrative agencies promulgate vast quantities of regulations, many of which. are binding upon all persons, states and
private citizens alike. After New York, it is clear that neither Congress nor administrative agencies may use their regulatory power
to command legislative actions by the States. But what if a federal
agency uses its rule-making power to bind the States in common
with all other persons? Gregory requires a plain statement of the
congressional intent to bind the States. But what kind of plain
statement (and by whom) is sufficient? Congress could, of
course, deliver an adequate plain statement in legislation which
precisely delineates the fashion in which states are required to
comply. Congress could also enact legislation with no such statement, but which devolves rule-making power upon an agency.
Would the agency's plain statement of its intent to bind the
States by regulation be sufficient?
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This problem appears to be answered in several ways by the
emerging process federalism. First, agency action in the absence
of a congressionalplain statement of intent to bind the States, even
when the agency plainly states its own intent to govern states,
seems to be the product of a defective political process because
there has been no effective input into the immediate agency decision by state representatives. Administrators are not responsible
to states; at best, they are responsible to the President or to Congress. The President is, unlike Congress, not responsible to states
but to the national polity. To be sure, both the constitutional
mechanics (the electoral college) and the realities of presidential
politics require the President to pay some attention to state concerns, but that concern is necessarily and properly subordinated
to concern for national interests.
Agencies truly accountable only to the President are, thus, defective parts of the political process, in the sense that Garcia assessed such defects. To the extent that agencies are accountable
to Congress, the defect is hardly less. Congress is an institution as
much as a collection of disparate representatives from the States.
Administrative agencies must be responsible to the institution
rather than to every member. True, some members are more important than others, but that fact only suggests that any federalism concerns pondered by an agency upon the demand of a
powerful member of Congress are likely to be skewed in that
member's direction, rather than being the product of the input
of all the States' representatives.
Moreover, many agencies are quite independent from either
Congress or the President. The expectation of the Court in Garcia that the States' interests would be fully and fairly considered
in a body composed of state representatives to the federal government is simply not met with respect to agencies operating
with any degree of independence. And even agencies directly
and strongly accountable to Congress are not reasonably expressive of the Court's assumption in Garcia about the nature of the
political process because their decisions, at bottom, are not the
product of contending interests from the several States expressed
through the medium of the people's elected representatives.
Furthermore, this problem is even more pronounced when an
agency acts pursuant to an ambiguous statute. When an agency
plausibly interprets ambiguous terms of a statute there is no opportunity for judicial review of the propriety of that agency inter-
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pretation.16 ° Accordingly, to permit agencies to promulgate
regulations binding the States in the absence of a plain statement
of congressional intent and pursuant to a vague statutory directive is to ignore the national political process as a body deliberating upon the federalism concerns of the States. That cannot be
what the Court in Garcia had in mind.
Can this be corrected by a perfectly clear statement in the statute that the agency is empowered to promulgate regulations
binding on the States, but with little or no statutory indication of
the precise requirements that the States must meet? Resolution
of this problem is not as simple. While Congress has failed to
make a plain statement of the specific manner in which it wants
the States regulated, it has been perfectly clear that it indeed
wants the States regulated. If the statute is not an impermissible
delegation of congressional lawmaking authority, it would otherwise be permissible for administrative agencies to formulate the
specifics. In this context, one can be reasonably certain that the
national political process has acted as Garciaenvisioned, but only
at a level of generality that is so removed from the specifics of
later agency-created rules that one might doubt whether the congressional representatives of the States would have adopted those
specific rules themselves.
Moreover, the principle of electoral accountability is compromised since members of Congress are accountable only for the
broad mandate-clean air, clean water, "fair" wages-while unaccountable administrators formulate the specifics that pinch the
States. Though it may be cognitively dissonant, electors may well
applaud the general mandate and deplore the specific applications. Making the connection between the broad mandate and
the specific rules more obvious would surely improve electoral
accountability and, insofar as this principle is a keystone of process federalism, one is entitled to question whether the Court
would permit such agency regulations to bind the States.
The foregoing problem is made even more interesting by the
fact that the principle of electoral accountability leads to consideration of altering existing doctrine in an area that does not implicate federalism. While it remains constitutionally axiomatic
that Congress may not delegate its legislative power, the practical
effect of this non-delegation doctrine is quite weak. As we all
160. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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know, Congress may invest administrative agencies with an enormous quantity of authority to makes rules that look just like laws.
In Yakus v. United States 6 ' the Court declared that
[t]he essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct ....

These

essentials are preserved when Congress has specified the basic
conditions of fact upon whose existence or occurrence, ascertained from relevant data by a designated administrative
agency, it directs that its statutory command shall be effective.
It is no objection that the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call for the exercise of
judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative
1 62
policy within the prescribed statutory framework.
But decisions since Yakus, none of which have found Congress to
have impermissibly delegated its lawmaking power, suggest that
Congress need not even establish policies and factual predicates
which trigger the policies.' 6 3 Or, if Congress must do so, because
Yakus is still good law, it is free to do so at an extremely high level
6
of generality.1 1
Even if we do not wish to push electoral accountability so far as
to restrict generally the ability of Congress to palm off on administrative agencies many of its own hard choices, we ought to
tighten the non-delegation doctrine so that it does not allow
agencies to enact regulations binding upon states without any
161. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
162. Id. at 424-25.
163. See KEI N-m GuLP DAvis, AnMINIsTRATIV LAW TREATisE 149-157, 160-66 (2d ed.
1978).
164. An example is Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,
448 U.S. 607 (1980), in which the Court found no impermissible delegation of legislative
power in a statute that defined occupational health and safety standards as those "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment" and then gave the
Secretary of Labor power to "set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health . . ." Id. at 612 (quoting the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1594, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5)). If we really desire to improve

electoral accountability we ought to rethink the degree of delegation we permit. As thenJustice Rehnquist put it, concurring in Industrial Union:
It is difficult to imagine a more obvious example of Congress simply avoiding a
choice which was both fundamental for purposes of the statute and yet so politically divisive that the necessary decision or compromise was difficult, if not impossible, to hammer out in the legislative forge ....
[T]he very essence of
legislative authority under our system... is the hard choices, and not the filling
in of the blanks, which must be made by the elected representatives of the
people.
Id. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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corresponding congressional mandate of the specific content of
the regulations. At least with respect to federalism concerns, we
can be reasonably sure that the infirmities of a weak non-delegation doctrine operate to vitiate the expectations of the Court in
Garciawhen it pinned its hopes for federalism on the political
process.
B.

Towards a More Substantive Legally EnforceableFederalism

A large part of the rationale for process federalism is the perceived substantive benefits inherent in federalism. If that is the
goal, process federalism is imperfectly suited to its accomplishment. Process federalism is only a protocol manual. To achieve
the perceived benefits of federalism it is necessary to have substantive, legally enforceable limits upon the ability of Congress to
claim all regulatory authority for itself. We know that the current
limits are exceedingly weak, so weak as to form no practical barrier to the steady extension of congressional authority over what
might, at any given moment, be thought to be the proper domain of state authority. Caution ought to be observed in imagining some new legally enforceable limits, for the history of the
Court's attempts to restrict the scope of congressional power
reveals a fair amount of expediency and manipulation of doctrine to suit desired ends, rather than reflecting a principle consistently applied and reasonably distant from partisan politics.
At least three new limits of substance might be imagined. The
first two are modest alterations of existing doctrine, designed to
respond narrowly to the implications of process federalism and
the realities of the national political process, reliance upon
which has spurred the growth of process federalism. The third is
a radical proposal that deserves discussion if not adoption. There
are significant difficulties with its implementation, and those may
prove to be insuperable or so large as to render the attempt
implausible.
1.

Tinkering with Deference to Congress under the Commerce Power

So long as Congress acts rationally in deciding that the class of
activities it regulates has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the courts will not disturb the congressional judgment.
Embedded in that test are several limits, but none of them
amount to much in practice. It might be thought that a measure
of congressional rationality is its actual or intended, purposes,
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rather than any purposes asserted after the fact. Or rationality
might inhere in congressional findings of fact on the question of
the substantial effect on interstate commerce of the proposed
class of regulated activities. "Substantial effect" might be measured independently of the congressional determination but
generally is not. In practice, Congress has carte blanche to regulate
what it wants. There may be nothing objectionable about the
scope of this power as applied to private individuals, 165 but as
applied to the States there are some more forceful objections.
First, given that Garcia declared that no viable distinction can
be made between the States as businesses and the States as autonomous governments, Congress has been invited to extend its immense commerce power to include every aspect of the States as
governments. But there must be limits on that power. In fact,
there are, and they are etiquette tips to Congress for attending a
constitutional supper party hosted by the States. Congress must
declare what it intends to devour before eating. Congress has actually to do the eating; it won't do to demand that the host state
eat what Congress puts on its plate. But it is acceptable for Congress to go back to the host state's kitchen and plan the meal
right down to who is served what. If we really believe in the constitutionally mandated structure of federalism and in the perceived benefits of federalism, we ought to devise a slightly more
challenging substantive burden for Congress to overcome when
it proposes to regulate the activities of the States.
Justice O'Connor declares that it is the constitutional obligation of the Court to monitor congressional regulation of the
States, even in the absence of benefits from federalism. 66 She is
surely correct, but there may be a great deal of argument about
the substance of judicial monitoring. If our goal is to preserve
the States as autonomous sources of public policy with sufficient
jurisdiction actually to make a difference in the landscape of
public policy, while simultaneously remaining committed to the
national political process as the primary caretaker of legislative
federalism, it is necessary to insist that Congress consider seri165. But there might be, too. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1987) (arguing for a return to the days of Gibbons v. Ogden
where the scope of the Commerce Clause was limited to interstate transportation, navigation, and sales and the activities closely incidental to them. All else should be left to the
states.).
166. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2418.
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ously the question of extending regulatory authority over the
States.
When Congress enacts legislation that binds private citizens,
the usual test of rationality applies. Under that test, Congress apparently may regulate the States whenever it plainly declares its
intent to do so and might rationally have concluded that the activity it seeks to regulate is one which significantly affects interstate commerce. But when the question is whether to displace
state authority over the state's own operations, whether or not
governmental or proprietary, Congress should be required to
make a much stronger showing of justification for binding the
States than when regulating private citizens. Congress should be required to bear the burden ofproving that it actually acted upon substantial evidence tending to establish that, unless the States were to be
regulated in the manner at issue, the States would be able to capture
benefits locally at the disproportionateexpense of outsiders, or that there
exists a compelling reason of national unity to regulate the States, and
that compelling reason of nationalunity can only be accomplished by the
regulation at issue.
This draws upon two other principles that guide our determination of the commerce power. When Congress has not acted
and the Court is attempting to chart the implied limits of the
commerce power upon state power to regulate, the Court at67
tempts to ferret out and invalidate protectionist legislation,
statutes that are designed to burden outsiders for the benefit of
insiders, 16 8 or statutes that are obstacles to needed unity or, at
least, comity. 169 When those principles are applied in Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court is attempting provisionally to delineate the outer boundaries of state power. As Justice O'Connor has noted in New York,
167. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (striking down a
state law barring importation of solid waste from other states because it impermissibly
discriminated against articles of commerce originating outside of the state).
168. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333
(1977) (North Carolina law requiring all apples sold or shipped in the state to be marked
only with a federal grade violated the Commerce Clause because it discriminated against
the display of Washington's more stringent grade); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (invalidating Iovra ban on the use of 65-foot
double trailers on its highways as a violation of the Commerce Clause because of the
disturbance it would have on interstate trucking traffic when such a length was permissible in surrounding states).
169. Cf Kassel supra note 168; Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. 359 U.S. 520
(1959) (invalidating Illinois safety measure specifying certain mud flaps for trucks operated within Illinois, disrupting the free flow of interstate trucking because such flaps were
legal in 45 other states).
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[t] hese questions can be viewed in either of two ways.... [Is an]
Act of Congress... authorized by one of the powers delegated
to Congress... [or does it] invade[ ] the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment[?]
... [T]he two
170
inquiries are mirror images of each other.
Because there are two roads leading to the same intersection, it
might make sense to use the method by which we determine the
limits of state power to gain some insight on the corresponding
reach of federal power. This is emphatically not to say that the
States would enjoy an unlimited range of immunity from federal
regulation. But it would be far broader than that existing today.
Thus, for example, states would be generally free from conforming to the Fair Labor Standards Act. That act, which regulates maximum hours and minimum wages, has produced much
litigation about the scope of the congressional power to regulate
the States, culminating in Garcia.There is likely to be nothing in
a state's hour and wage policies with respect to its employees that
is calculated to capture benefits locally at the expense of outsiders. Nor would compelling reasons of national unity unachievable in any other fashion be present. The wage and hour
conditions of state employees is simply not the stuff of which national unity is fabricated. National unity is hardly threatened if
California decides to require its highway patrol officers to work a
longer work week without overtime pay than the FLSA permits.
On the other hand, Congress would be likely to sustain its burden of proving that a state's failure to comply with the Clean Air
or Water Act would produce benefits locally (in the form of
cheaper energy production or lower industrial production costs)
with the costs falling disproportionately on outsiders. For example, Ohio's burning of dirty coal is likely to produce acid rain in
New England; Missouri's discharge of pollution into the Mississippi River adversely affects each of its downstream sisters. For
that matter, any state discharges of spent hydrocarbons is likely
to contribute to the global problem of a warming atmosphere.
None of this would restrain congressional ability to regulate
private citizens. The proposed additional burden on Congress
would only apply when Congress plainly indicates its intent to
regulate the States. Rather than contenting ourselves with a limit
upon Congress that is purely protocol, the proposed test would
ask Congress to justify its regulation of a state in terms of the pre170. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417.
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existing doctrine that serves to describe the outer limits of state
authority under the Commerce Clause.
2.

Treating the ConditionalSpending Power more Skeptically

If the only alteration in the existing doctrine that operates to
impose substantive limits on congressional authority to regulate
the States is to the commerce power, the changes would be ineffectual to solve the perceived problem. The conditional spending
power-the power of Congress to impose conditions along with
the funds it expends-is an equally powerful source of federal
authority to regulate the States. The doctrine arose at a time
when federal spending programs were relatively few and the expenditures upon those programs relatively minor. But as the federal budget has grown ever larger, federal spending initiatives
have steadily increased in number and expenditures, and states
have become increasingly reliant upon the federal purse. If it was
ever true, as a practical matter, that states could simply reject federal money if they disliked the regulatory conditions attached,
that is certainly not the reality of today. Nonetheless, the legally
enforceable limits upon congressional power to regulate the
States by way of conditions attached to federal spending are not
particularly strong.
Congress may only impose conditions that are related to federal interests in "particular national projects or programs," that
do not coerce the States, are not violative of some other constitutional provision, and then, only if Congress expresses the condition "unambiguously."' 7 ' But under these limits, or their
precursors, Congress has been able to exclude political party officials from some positions in state government,' 7 2 alter existing
state governments and compel the creation of new such departments,17 3 or require changes to the allocation of executive and
171. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (upholding a federal statute that
conditioned each state's receipt of federal highway funds upon the adoption of a minimum drinking age, because he condition related to the purpose of the federal grant,
that is, safer highways, and it did not compel the States to forfeit any sovereignty reserved
to them by the 10th or 21st Amendments).
172. See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n., 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (upholding Congress' power to withhold federal highway funds unless a state removed a state
official who engaged in political activities prohibited by the Hatch Act).
173. In the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794, Congress conditioned
various types of aid to the handicapped on the States' creation of new agencies to assist
the handicapped, regardless of whether state statutory or constitutional law assigned
those functions elsewhere or even forbade the creation of the new agency. This exercise
of the conditional spending power was upheld in Florida Dep't. of Health and Rehabilita-
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legislative authority within a state or between the state and its
political subdivisions." 74
All of these conclusions would seem suspect in principle with
the advent of New York-style process federalism, for each seems to
compel the States to change their structure or internal policies to
conform to a federal command. True, the States are required to
do so only if they take the money, and the courts naively presume
them to be free to decline, however impracticable that may be.
The answer may be to take coercion seriously and deny to Congress the power to impose regulatory conditions on federal
spending where such conditions are coercive in the sense that
the States could not reasonably be expected to forego the federal
bait. 75 A dose of reality would be injected into the otherwise artificial construct of coercion.
tive Serv. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 585 F. 2d 150
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979).
In the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300k-300n, Congress required the States to reorganize their governmental departments and alter their policies in order to receive federal funds for health planning services. This was upheld as to North Carolina even though the required changes were
explicitly forbade by North Carolina's Constitution. See North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v.
Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd mem, 435 U.S. 962 (1978) (Congress'
power to condition the receipt of federal health funds on the existence of certain standards for health care facilities in each state is not limited by state sovereignty).
174. See Shapp v. Sloan, 391 A. 2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom., Thornburgh v.
Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979) (upholding condition to receipt of federal grant requiring
reallocation of legislative and executive authority); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood
School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70, 105 S. Ct. 695, 702-03 (1985) (federal conditions on
receipt of federal funds by political subdivisions of a state held to override more restrictive state laws on the use of such monies).
175. In the case of conditional spending by Congress, coercion occurs whenever Congress has induced the States to rely upon the federal tap, only to have a condition attached once that reliance has become well-established. If Congress wants to condition
spending it had better do so at the outset of the program and not at some point after the
fact when the States can not reasonably be expected to spurn funds and programs upon
which they have relied in making their remaining public policy choices.
This limit makes sense in terms of our post-Garcia commitment to the national political
process as the principal agent for resolution of legislative federalism. As Albert Rosenthal
has put it,
[w] hether or not there is enough political influence at the state and local government level to prevent the more intrusive direct threats to the autonomy of those
governments, the same process may not work effectively to forestall similar interference through coercive conditions. A continued high level of federal financial
assistance will often be of great importance to state and local governments and a
focus of substantial lobbying activities on their part; these governments may not
find it politically expedient to dilute their efforts to obtain such funds by simultaneously campaigning against the conditions, however objectionable they may
appear to be.
AlbertJ. Rosenthal, ConditionalFederal Spending and the Constitution,39 STAN'.
L. REv. 1103,
1141 (1987) (analyzing the relationship between the permissibility of conditional spending and the powers of the federal government).
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Another way in which the conditional spending power might
be restrained is to require a much closer connection between the
condition imposed and the asserted federal interest in the spending initiative to which the condition is attached. Instead of simply
contenting itself with the existence of "some" connection, the
Court might insist that Congress demonstrate that the connection is substantial and well-suited to the accomplishment of the
asserted federal interest. This would force Congress to specify
conditions that actually have something to do with how federal
money is spent, rather than simply using the swollen federal
purse as an excuse for imposing regulatory conditions upon the
States. Dissenting in South Dakota v. Dole, Justice O'Connor
sought to distinguish between conditions that specify how the
money is to be spent and those which lack such specification.
The former should be presumptively valid spending conditions;
the latter should be subject to much more searching inquiry as
not presumptively connected to the federal
regulatory conditions 76
interest in spending.'
3.

Consideringa Blanket Immunity for States from Federal
Regulation under the Commerce Power.

A radical suggestion, and one that is offered more for discussion than with the intent of urging its adoption, is to consider
creation of a blanket immunity for states. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Garcia,noted that
[t]he essence of our federal system is that within the realm of
authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States
must be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens
choose for the common weal .... Any rule of state immunity
Moreover, federal spending has the effect of purchasing the independentjudgment of
state and local officials by increasing the patronage available to them, thus making state
and local politicians willing participants in the imposition of regulatory conditions upon
the States. See Robert M. Cover, Federalism and Administrative Structure, 92 YALE L. J, 1342
(1983) (arguing that federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments effectively prevents healthy local opposition to national programs and subverts the political process as
the only viable restraint upon congressional overreaching. Rather, the federal government should provide funds directly and be responsible for the administration of the programs it funds in order to provoke a state-federal combat as a check on national power).
But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALz L. J. 1344
(1983) (supporting federal grants to state and local governments as a means of protecting
the interest of citizens of other states, encouraging responsible behavior by both national
and state politicians, and liberating state and local funds for other purposes). The result
is that the pressure expected to be brought to bear on the national political process on
behalf of state and local interests is unlikely to materialize.
176. SeeDole, 483 U.S. at 212-218 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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that looks to the 'traditional,' 'integral,' or 'necessary' nature
of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about
which state policies it
177
favors and which ones it dislikes.
Although this observation was made in the course of justifying
the shift to an almost wholly politically enforceable federalism, it
also provides the justification for a blanket immunity. If there is
no principled way to distinguish among various state activities,
the real question becomes whether to enforce federalism politically or legally. If political enforcement is desired, Garcia is the
result and the vestigial form of legal enforcement is process federalism. But if one believes, as John Marshall did, that "the very
essence ofjudicial duty" is to enforce the Constitution when legislation collides with it, 78s legal enforcement of federalism is to
be preferred to the political brand.
Acknowledging the inability to distinguish among the various
functions of a state, the result is to admit that the States enjoy a
complete immunity from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. This is radical, and perhaps ultimately not a satisfactory alternative, but it deserves some reflective rather than
reflexive thought.
In an earlier New York v. United States,'" 9 the Court upheld a
federal tax on New York's sale of bottled mineral water, but only
because it thought that the tax did not "infringe... the performance of its functions as a government which the Constitution recognizes as sovereign."'8 0 That distinction has, of course, largely
been rendered obsolete by Garcia.But in dissent, Justices Douglas and Black contended that
[t]he fact that local government may enter the domain of private business enterprise and operate a project for profit does
not put it in the class of private enterprise... Local government exists to provide for the welfare of its people... If the
federal government can place the local governments on its tax
collector's list, their capacity to serve the needs of their citizens is at once hampered or curtailed... Many state activities
are in marginal enterprises where private capital refuses to

177. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546 (1985).
178. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (all laws in conflict with
the Constitution are void).
179. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
180. Id. at 588 (Stone, CJ., concurring).
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venture. Add to the cost of these projects a federal tax and the
social program may be destroyed before it can be launched.' 8 '

Under this view, the States must be free to fashion public policy
for the benefit of all its citizens by using any particular method. If
the States wish to establish public ownership of all industrial enterprise within their borders, and accomplish that objective in a
constitutionally permitted fashion, they should be free to operate
those enterprises for the public benefit, free from federal
oversight.
But, objectors would declare, this would strip Congress of
nearly all control over the activities of the States. The States
would, however, continue to be subject to all the constitutional
restraints that apply to them. They could not engage in racial
discrimination or, absent very good reason, sex discrimination.
But they could fix prices, objectors might cry, or engage in inside
trading of securities, or pollute air and water with impunity.
However, this list of horribles, and others too, are susceptible
to control by application of existing constitutional principles.
Our understanding of the Dormant Commerce Clause is that
one of the implicit limits upon the States is that they are not free,
absent congressional authorization, to impose costs on outsiders
in order to reap benefits locally. Each one of the horribles just
paraded is susceptible to control by application of that principle.
State price fixing is likely to impose costs on outsiders, to the
extent that the affected consumers are outside of the state, with
benefits accruing locally in the form of higher profits. In the unlikely event that all the costs and benefits of state price fixing
were to be contained within the state, the choice of that as beneficial public policy is one for the state to decide. Inside trading of
securities is virtually certain to impose costs widely, upon all contemporaneous traders of the affected securities, with the benefits
captured locally in the form of trading profits. Similarly, air and
water pollution by states is highly likely to impose substantial
costs on outsiders (downstream and downwind states or nations)
with whatever benefit, usually in the form of lower operating
costs, captured locally.
True, this scheme would impose a substantial burden on
courts to apply this constitutional analysis consistently and accurately, and it would require some distinction between the cases
181. Id. at 593-94 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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just mentioned and those in which costs and benefits are partially, but not disproportionately, borne by outsiders.
Is this feasible? Perhaps not. The record of the courts in sorting out the Dormant Commerce Clause on this basis is not one to
inspire great confidence. Courts are not always able to see the
incidence of costs and benefits when they are not obviously displayed via the mechanism of protectionist legislative intent.
Nonetheless, the idea is one that could usefully be debated,
before being discarded as unworkable and undesirable.
But we need not reach out for the radical stroke in order to
add some substantive strength to legally enforceable federalism.
A wholesome check upon the power of Congress to regulate the
States would be created by requiring Congress to demonstrate
more clearly the national benefits to be obtained by direct regulation of the States under its commerce power. Similarly, viewing
the conditional spending power more skeptically and realistically, by treating coercion seriously and demanding that Congress demonstrate the connection between the federal interest in
spending and the condition attached, would also limit the ability
of Congress to regulate the States without a substantial need to
do so.
V.

CONCLUSION

Process federalism is the emerging vestigial strain of legally enforceable federalism that has responded to Garcia's consignment
of federalism to the national political process. It consists of ajudicial warning that some defects in the political process might be
so severe as to merit invalidation of legislation which is the product of that defective political process, a requirement that Congress declare explicitly its intent to regulate the States, and a
prohibition upon congressional legislation that commands the
States to regulate. This emerging process federalism is premised
on the need to maintain electoral accountability of both federal
and state representatives and on the perceived benefits of decentralized federalism.
Process federalism is rooted in long-standing conceptions of
federalism with respect to the judicial power. Such doctrines as
Younger abstention and the adequate and independent state
grounds doctrine are conceptually very similar to the emerging
legislative process federalism. Given the current preference for
politically enforceable federalism limits upon the federal legisla-
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tive power, process federalism makes sense: it keeps the political
process accountable to the people and the regions in which they
live.
The accountability premise upon which process federalism is
constructed suggests at least one avenue of likely extension:
prohibiting administrative agency regulations from binding
states in most circumstances. The "perceived benefits of federalism" premise suggests possible alterations in existing doctrine: requiring Congress to justify more stringently its use of the
commerce power to regulate states, viewing the conditional
spending power more skeptically and, more radically, considering adoption of a blanket immunity rule for states. The latter
suggestion places upon the Constitution the entire responsibility
for curbing state behavior that is inimical to the national welfare.
Those problems may not be insuperable but are certainly
substantial.
Process federalism is an evolving thought; one important value
of its existence is that it will force us to consider both the value of
a truly federal system and the relative virtues of securing that federalism primarily by politics or by law. It has the seeds of radicalism embedded in it. We ought to rejoice at that and consider the
positive aspects of a more legally enforceable and decentralized
federalism. But in doing so we ought to be realists and ask of the
Constitution and its judicial patrolmen only what they can reasonably deliver.

